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Abstract
This paper extends a standard intertemporal labor supply model to account for pro-
gressive taxation as well as the joint determination of hourly wages and hours worked.
We show, qualitatively and quantitatively, that these two factors have implications for
estimating the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, we show how to use
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to interpret the labor supply response to a tax
change. Failure to account for wage-hours ties within a progressive tax system leads to
an hours response to a change in marginal tax rates that may be understated by as much
as 10 percent for men and 17 percent for women.
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http://www.chicagofed.org/economists/EricFrench.cfm/. Author correspondence to Daniel Aaronson or
Eric French, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 230 S. LaSalle St., Chicago, IL 60604. Telephone (312)322-6831,
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11 Introduction
When evaluating the costs and beneﬁts of modiﬁcations to the tax system, as in Altig et
al (2001), a critical elasticity of interest is the intertemporal labor supply elasticity. While
some recent research explicitly studies reactions to speciﬁc tax reforms, a more common
approach to approximating these eﬀects is to employ estimates of the labor supply response
to wage changes using the methods of MaCurdy (1981), Altonji (1986), and Browning et al
(1985). Among men, this labor supply elasticity is commonly believed to be low, with most
estimates ranging from 0 to 0.5. For women, the estimate is considerably more uncertain but
believed to be around 1. Yet, some recent studies ﬁnd larger income responses to speciﬁc tax
changes than what would be expected given the estimated labor supply responses to wage
changes.1 This is potentially veriﬁcation that estimated wage elasticities lead tax analysts to
underpredict the labor supply response to speciﬁc tax changes.
In this paper, we emphasize two erroneous simplifying assumptions in standard labor
supply models that could also contribute to diﬀerent inferences about behavioral responses
to tax changes. First, most labor supply models ignore the joint determination of hours
worked and hourly wages.2 Second, many intertemporal models ignore progressive labor
taxation.
In this paper, we examine how progressive taxation and the joint determination of hours
and wages aﬀects estimates of structural preference parameters. We also consider how to use
estimated preference parameters to predict the likely labor supply responses to tax changes.
We show that failure to account for progressive taxation and the joint determination of hours
and wages leads to a small bias when estimating the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
However, it is important to consider tied wage-hours oﬀers and progressive taxation when
using this estimated preference parameter to predict the likely labor supply responses to tax
changes.
1Feldstein (1995) and others attribute this diﬀerence to tax avoidance and retiming and reshifting of
transactions, rather than labor supply adjustments. See Slemrod (1998) for a useful nontechnical summary
and discussion of the literature.
2Aaronson and French (2004) discuss identiﬁcation and estimation of a causal link from hours worked to
hourly wages - the so-called part-time wage penalty. They identify this relationship using exogenous variation
in hours worked resulting from social security rules. Papers that use other identiﬁcation strategies, primarily
related to mothers returning to the workforce, include Rosen (1976), Moﬃtt (1984), Lundberg (1985), Biddle
and Zarkin (1989), Blank (1990), and Ermisch and Wright (1993).
2Solving a standard life-cycle labor supply model, augmented to include tied wage-hours
oﬀers and progressive labor income taxation, illuminates two fundamental model misspeciﬁca-
tion problems. First, in a model where the wage is a function of hours worked, an increase in
the post-tax wage resulting from a tax cut potentially leads to an increase in hours worked.
This increase in hours worked leads to an increase in the pre-tax wage through the tied
wage-hours eﬀect, further escalating hours worked. Therefore, there is a larger labor supply
response to a tax change than to an equally sized wage change. Since most models do not
account for tied wage-hours oﬀers, the latter eﬀect (i.e. the eﬀect of increased hours worked
on increasing wages, which should in turn further increase hours worked) is ignored. There-
fore, this model misspeciﬁcation problem causes tax analysts to understate the labor supply
response to a tax change.
However, a tax cut may increase hours and consequently income, which in turn can shift
the individual into a higher tax bracket. This type of “bracket creep” reduces the variation
in the post-tax wage, implying that progressive taxation should dampen the labor supply
response to the tax cut. Consequently, the impact of tied wage-hours oﬀers and progressive
taxation on labor supply tends to oﬀset one another. Nevertheless, since the progressive
taxation eﬀect seems less important than the eﬀect of tied wage-hours oﬀers, tax analysts are
likely to continue to underpredict the labor supply response to tax changes.
We are not the ﬁrst to observe that the labor supply function must be augmented to
account for the marginal eﬀect of work hours on wages and progressive tax schedules.3 How-
ever, we believe that we are the ﬁrst to show analytically why failure to account for tied
wage-hours oﬀers in both proportional and progressive tax systems will produce labor supply
elasticities that are diﬀerent than the elasticity of interest to tax analysts.
We consider strategies for consistently identifying the structural preference parameter,
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, showing that many estimation schemes do not
recover this parameter in the presence of progressive taxation and hours-wage ties. Because
of the criticisms raised against maximum likelihood estimation of labor supply models using
kinked budget constraints (MaCurdy et al. (1990)), we follow the approach of MaCurdy
et al. (1990) and Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) and use smooth approximations to the tax
3See Rosen (1976), Moﬃtt (1984), and Lundberg (1985) on tied wage-hours within static labor supply
frameworks. See MaCurdy (1983), Hausman (1985), MaCurdy et al. (1990), Mulligan (1999) and Ziliak and
Kniesner (1999) on progressive taxes.
3code.4 In particular, we analyze a common instrumental variable strategy in the presence of
progressive taxes and hours-wage oﬀers. We then show how to use the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution to interpret the labor supply response to a change in marginal tax rates. Using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, labor supply responses to tax changes that account
for tied wage-hours and progressivity are compared with those that do not and the resulting
diﬀerence can be up to 10 percent for men.
Finally, we analytically evaluate the labor supply response to a tax change using a range
of relevant parameter values for the labor supply response to a wage change, the tied wage-
hours relationship, and the progressivity of the labor income tax schedule. With enough
progressivity, the tied wage-hours and progressivity eﬀects can completely oﬀset each other.
But assuming a level of progressivity observed, on average, in the U.S. over the last 30 years
results in a diﬀerence of around 8 percent for men, and potentially up to 17 percent for
women.
2 Dynamic intertemporal labor supply elasticities with tied
wage-hours oﬀers and progressive taxation
2.1 Model
We begin with the canonical intertemporal labor supply model,5 as in MaCurdy (1985),
augmented to account for tied wage-hours oﬀers and a potentially progressive labor income















where U is the expected discounted present value of lifetime utility, cit is consumption, v(.)i s
some increasing concave function, hit is hours worked, and εit is the person and year speciﬁc
preference for work. The parameter σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the usual
4Alternative approaches to handling these criticisms are in Blundell et al. (1998) and Heim and Meyer
(2003).
5The key results from this section do not depend on whether the model is static or dynamic. However, the
intertemporal model simpliﬁes the analysis because it allows us to focus more on the substitution eﬀect of a
tax change. In static models and models with liquidity constraints, tax changes cause an additional change in
the marginal utility of wealth. Moreover, if individuals do make forward looking decisions, many measures of
non-labor income that are used in static models are endogenous and inconsistent estimates will result.
4object of interest in dynamic labor supply studies.
Labor supply models typically assume that a worker receives a ﬁxed wage oﬀer, then
chooses the number of hours to work given that wage. However, ﬁrms may not be indiﬀerent
to the number of hours worked. For example, Lewis (1969) and Barzel (1973) argue that the
ﬁxed cost involved in hiring and retaining workers, including the cost of training and aspects
of compensation unrelated to hours worked, can be spread over more hours of work, causing
the wage to be increasing in hours worked.6
Operationally, it is typical in the empirical literature to specify the wage as a linear
function of hours worked:
lnwit = αit + θ lnhit (2)
where αit represents an individual’s underlying productivity or technology during a speciﬁc
year and θ maps hours worked into the wage.
Two aspects of equation (2) are worth highlighting. First, the linearized relationship in
equation (2) provides a good approximation to a structural relationship between the wage
and hours worked, at least in the range of hours to which the majority of workers in our
empirical example are situated. This case is made in detail in appendix A. Second, the
estimate of θ that we use in the analysis is based on samples of workers that do not switch
employers. This is important because virtually all of the estimates in the literature, as well
as the static models of Lewis and Barzel, call into question whether the estimated wage-hours
relationship represents a long-run equilibrium, where hours and wages changes only happen
across jobs. But in Aaronson and French (2004), workers who cut their hours receive wage
reductions even when working for the same employer, consistent with the hypothesis that
employers face ﬁxed costs of work.
Finally, the individual faces the dynamic budget constraint:
Ait+1 =( 1+rt(1 − τA))(Ait + wit(loghit)hit + yit − τit − cit)( 3 )
where Ait are time t assets, rt the interest rate, τA is the tax rate on capital income, yit is
6Barzel also contends that exhaustion eventually causes marginal productivity (and thus the wage) to
declines once the workday reaches a certain threshold.
5spousal income, and τit denotes labor income taxes:7
τit = τ(wit(loghit)hit + yit)( 4 )
Maximization of (1) subject to equations (2) and the dynamic budget constraint (3) yields
the labor supply function:
loghit = σ

log(1 − τ (.)) + logwit +l o g( 1+θ)

+ σ logλit + εit. (5)
The term in square brackets is the logarithm of the opportunity cost of time. The ﬁrst
part of this term reﬂects the cost of taxation that arises from additional working hours and
is sometimes referred to as the log of the “net of tax price”. Note that τ 
it is the marginal tax
rate and thus 1 − τ 
it is the share of labor income that the individual keeps at the margin.
The second part, the wage, arises because income increases with hours worked, holding the
wage ﬁxed. The third part occurs because the worker is paid a higher hourly wage when she
works more hours, if hours and wages are tied. If changes in hours of work impact neither
the wage (i.e. θ = 0) nor the amount of taxes paid (i.e. τ (.) = 0), equation (5) becomes the
standard estimating equation in intertemporal labor supply models. The term λit ≡ v (cit)
represents the marginal utility of wealth.






+ σ∆logλit +∆ εit. (6)
¿From equation (6), it is clear that obtaining consistent estimates of σ requires valid
controls for changes in marginal tax rates, preferences, and the marginal utility of wealth.
For the latter, we follow MaCurdy (1985) and derive an estimating equation that controls for
changes in the marginal utility of wealth:8
7This analysis looks at anticipated changes in tax rates. If a tax change is unanticipated, we must consider
both movements along and ”parametric shifts” (e.g. MaCurdy, 1985) in the lifecycle wage proﬁle. Furthermore,
we assume that capital income does not aﬀect labor income tax rates, which simpliﬁes the analysis (Blomquist,
1985) but is problematic in that interest and dividends are taxed like ordinary income. Capital gains were
taxed like ordinary income prior to 1997 and are still taxed that way for investments held less than one year.
For long-term investments, there are currently two marginal rates. However, if capital gains are primarily
concentrated among higher income households (see Burman and Ricoy (1997) for evidence), these rates could
be considered signiﬁcantly more proportional in practice than labor income. For tractability and due to
limitations in the data, we therefore ignore these aspects of the progressive tax schedule.
8He shows that the marginal utility of wealth, and in approximation its log, follows a random walk with
6∆loghit = σ

∆log(1− τ (.)) + ∆logwit

− σ logβ(1 + rt−1(1 − τA)) + σ




where  it is the innovation to the marginal utility of wealth.
The remainder of this paper examines two general questions: how to obtain consistent
estimates of σ and how to use σ to infer the labor supply response to a tax change. Sections
2.2 and 2.3 consider, in turn, the roles of tied wage-hours oﬀers and progressive taxation for
these issues.
2.2 The case of proportional taxes
When taxation is progressive, analyzing the eﬀects of taxes on labor supply becomes a bit
complicated. In this section, we consider proportional taxation in order to develop intuition
about the eﬀect of tax changes on labor supply in the presence of tied wage-hours oﬀers.
Proportional taxes imply that a constant share of labor income is taxed and therefore the
marginal tax rate is a constant:
τ 
it(.)=τ . (8)
In this case, marginal tax rates disappear from equation (7).
First, consider the problem of identifying σ. Note from equations (2) and (5) that changes
in εit will aﬀect hours, which will in turn aﬀect the wage. Therefore, logwit is correlated with
εit. This is the simultaneous equations bias problem. In addition, wage changes are likely
correlated with the marginal utility of wealth. Consequently, a good instrument needs to be
correlated with ∆lnwit but uncorrelated with rt,  it, and ∆εit. If such an instrument, Zit,







IV is a consistent estimator of σ.9
drift. See appendix B for a derivation of equation (7).
9This result relies on the assumption that the log wage increases linearly in log hours. However, Barzel
7However, the parameter σ is no longer suﬃcient for understanding the labor supply re-
sponse to taxation if wages are tied to hours. In particular, tax analysts are interested in the















There are three pieces on the right hand side of equation (10), reﬂecting diﬀerent labor
supply incentives arising from a tax change. The ﬁrst term reﬂects changes in the post-tax
wage, holding the pre-tax wage ﬁxed. A reduction in taxes causes an increase in the post-tax
wage, which in turn aﬀects labor supply. This is the usual object of interest in intertemporal
labor supply studies. The second term arises from the eﬀect of hours worked upon the wage.
If σ>0, reductions in taxes cause increases in hours worked, which in turn increases the
pre-tax wage (because of tied wage-hours oﬀers). Because the pre-tax wage increases, hours
worked increase further. The ﬁnal term is the eﬀect of the tax change on the marginal utility
of wealth. Increases in (1−τ ) (i.e., decreases in marginal tax rates) tend to increase lifetime
wealth and thus decrease its marginal utility,
∆logλit
∆log(1−τ ) ≤ 0. Nevertheless, the labor supply
response to tax changes, holding the marginal utility of wealth constant, is an important
object since it is used to calibrate many of the important models used for tax analysis (Altig
et al. (2001)) and it is a measure of the deadweight loss associated with tax changes (Ziliak
and Kniesner, 1999). Therefore, we assume
dlogλit











Equations (9) and (11) demonstrate that the labor supply response to a one percent
increase in 1 − τ  is larger than the labor supply response to a one percent wage increase,
holding the marginal utility of wealth constant. Therefore, the strategy used to identify the
labor supply elasticity can be critical. The magnitude of this diﬀerence, and identiﬁcation
strategies used to uncover it, are discussed further below.
(1973) speculates that at very long work weeks, an increase in hours might lower wages as exhaustion reduces
productivity, so w
  (loghit) < 0. Nevertheless, the existence of tied wage-hours oﬀers need not necessarily
lead to inconsistent estimates of σ. It is non-linearity in the wage-hours relationship that causes inconsistent
estimates of σ. See appendix A for more discussion of this issue.
10If θ>0 then the budget set is not convex. However, equation (11) still represents an equilibrium condition
so long as σθ < 1. This condition is satisﬁed for reasonable parameter values.
82.3 The case of progressive taxes
The above analysis provides an assessment of the importance of model mis-speciﬁcation
introduced by wage-hours ties. In this section, we discuss a further complication, allowing for
the possibility that increased hours of work push households into a higher tax bracket. This
type of bracket creep reduces the variation in the post-tax wage, implying that progressive
taxation should dampen the labor supply response to a pre-tax wage and tax change.11
Ignoring progressive taxation leads to a downward biased estimate of σ and an upward biased
estimate of the labor supply response to a tax change for a given σ. It is the latter eﬀect that
is more important, however. An increase in the marginal tax rate causes a decrease in work
hours, naturally decreasing labor income and potentially lowering the marginal labor tax
rate that the worker faces. Therefore, progressive taxation attenuates the eﬀect of the initial
increase in the marginal tax rate. Consequently, the impact of tied wage-hours oﬀers and
progressive taxation on labor supply tends to oﬀset one another.
In order to capture a potentially progressive (or regressive through, for example, the
Earned Income Tax Credit) tax schedule, we let the marginal tax rate depend on a polynomial
in log(withit + yit): 12
































Recall that our interest is in the relationship between σ∗
IV (the probability limit of the IV
estimator using the pre-tax wage) , the structural parameter σ, and the labor supply response
11Of course, the extent of this eﬀect depends on the distribution of taxpayers on the tax schedule. If most
are far from the kinks, the eﬀect will be small.
12This approach follows MaCurdy et al. (1990) and Ziliak and Kniesner (1999). In practice, we use a third
order polynomial in log income. We also tried higher order polynomials, although this adjustment did not
aﬀect our results. A diﬀerentiable tax function makes the evaluation of the labor supply response to tax
changes more straightforward, as in equation (14).
9to a tax change. However, with progressive taxation, it is impossible to know the relationship
between σ∗
IV and σ without knowing the distribution of preference and productivity shocks,
αit and εit, as the higher order moments include covariances between income and αit and εit.
Unfortunately, no evidence exists on these parameters because it is diﬃcult to distinguish
variation in αit and εit from variation in hours and wages induced by measurement error.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to obtain consistent estimates of σ using instrumental
variables procedures. Instead of using the relationship between the pre-tax wage and labor
supply, it is necessary to use the relationship between the post-tax wage and labor supply.
Next, we describe the association between σ and a tax change, γ0. Note that a one
percentage point change in γ0 increases the after tax wage by one percentage point, holding




dγ0 =0 13 and combining equations (12), (13), and
































. The ﬁrst part of this term, (1 + θ), represents the percent increase in
own labor income due to a one percent increase in hours. The second term depicts the percent
change in the quantity 1−τ 
it caused by shifting own and spouse’s labor income by one percent.
Therefore, the entire term is roughly the percent change in 1 − τ 
it caused by changing hours
by one percent. Intuitively, this term captures the result that when γ0 increases (in other
words, as marginal tax rates fall), individuals supply more hours to the market. However, this
initial eﬀect is dampened by progressive taxation since increased income pushes the worker
into a higher marginal tax rate, thus attenuating the eﬀect of γ0.15
Equations (11) and (14) diﬀer only in that individuals are aware that changes in labor
supply cause changes in the marginal tax rate in the latter equation. Equation (11) em-
13This assumption implies that changes in the marginal tax rate will equally impact husband’s and wife’s
labor supply, leaving the ratio of the wife’s to husband’s income unchanged.
14Note that the elasticity of interest is most likely with respect to a vertical shift in the marginal tax



























10phasizes only tied wage-hours and how failure to account for this relationship leads to an
understatement of the importance of tax changes. Failure to account for progressive taxa-
tion, on the other hand, causes the researcher to overstate the importance of tax changes.
Therefore, the two eﬀects tend to oﬀset.








is complicated, it is still straight-
forward to estimate σ and σ∗
IV given the approaches we have discussed. Equation (14) and
estimates of {γk}K







. We present such estimates in section
5.
Moreover, if log(1−τ (.)) is linear in log labor income (i.e., γk =0f o rk>1), it is possible
to obtain simple analytic solutions to help give our results some intuition. First, it is possible
to qualitatively show that σ∗






Intuitively, σ measures the labor supply response to a change in the post-tax wage, whereas
σ∗
IV measures the labor supply response to a change in the pre-tax wage. Note that a 1
percent increase in the pre-tax wage causes less than a 1 percent change in the post-tax
wage. Therefore, an anticipated 1 percent change in the post-tax wage causes a σ percent
change in hours worked. However, a 1 percent change in the pre-tax wage will lead to less
than a 1 percent change in the post-tax wage and thus less than a σ percent change in hours
worked.







can be derived analytically using
equations (14) and (15). Again assuming that log(1−τ (.)) is linear in log labor income and















After describing the estimation strategy and data in the next two sections, section 5











In Section 2, we pointed out problems with inferring the labor supply response to a
tax change using the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. However, failure to account
for progressive taxation also leads to inconsistent estimates of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. Moreover, failure to account for tied wage-hours oﬀers sometimes leads
to inconsistent estimates, depending on the instrument set. These points are somewhat
technical, so we derive the asymptotic properties of diﬀerent estimators in Appendix C.
Our strategy for analyzing the importance of jointly determined hours and wages in a
progressive tax world is to directly estimate σ, accounting explicitly for jointly determined
hours and wages and progressive taxes. We compare estimates that account for wage-hours
ties and progressive taxes with those that ignore both factors. This allows us to assess the
bias described in the previous section when data and other methodological choices are ﬁxed.
There are ﬁve terms on the right hand side of our estimating equation (7). The ﬁrst term,
changes in the marginal tax rate, are explicitly simulated for each individual using the NBER’s
Taxsim program, augmented with payroll tax rates obtained from the Tax Policy Center at
the Urban Institute.16 The third term, logβ(1 + rt−1(1 − τA)) is accounted for by including
year dummies and education controls. The year dummies account for changes in the interest
rate over time. The education group controls account for variation in subjective discount rates
across education groups.17 Health status change regressors capture the observed component
of preference shifters, the ﬁfth term, with the remaining portion of that term assumed to be
white noise.
However, an important problem emerges with regard to the ﬁrst, second and fourth terms
of equation (7). First, the marginal tax rate is endogenous because hours choices aﬀect this
rate. Consequently, E[(∆log(1 − τ (.)))(∆εit)]  =0 . Second, the wage change is potentially
correlated with the innovation to the marginal utility of wealth if the wage change is unan-




 = 0. Therefore, we need anticipated sources of post-tax
wage variation that are uncorrelated with preferences to identify σ.
One common strategy to solve this problem is to exploit the life cycle wage proﬁle and
assume that workers are able to anticipate future post-tax wage growth based on their age,
16See www.nber.org/taxsim/ for more details. Marginal rates are computed relative to the next $1,000 in
wage income. The data section describes the computations in more detail.
17See Mulligan (1999) for a discussion of the cross-sectional evidence.
12as in MaCurdy (1981) and Browning et al. (1985), among many others. The age proﬁle will
give consistent estimates of σ so long as age-speciﬁc variation in preferences is fully accounted
for using health status and an age trend.18 Appendix C contains a more thorough discussion
of the identiﬁcation diﬃculties of standard instrumental variables strategies in a setting with
tied wage-hours. It shows that using age as an instrument will yield consistent estimates of
σ. One important point of this discussion is that just as the eﬀects of tied wage-hours oﬀers
and progressive taxation tend to oﬀset when estimating the labor supply response to a tax
change for a given σ, the eﬀects of these two factors are likely to oﬀset when computing the
bias in the estimate value of σ.
4D a t a
Similar to many previous studies of taxes and labor supply, we use the PSID to estimate
σ. Our sample consists of male household heads aged 25 to 60 between 1977 and 1989. We
drop the self-employed because their capital and labor income (as well as taxes) is diﬃcult
to distinguish. We also drop those workers with fewer than 300 or more than 4,500 hours, as
well as those who earn less than $3 or more than $100 per hour. Our selection criterion leads
to a sample of 2,393 working men encompassing 15,989 person-years observations.
Two variables require further elaboration. First, we use a common measure of the hourly
wage, annual earnings divided by annual hours. However, such a measure introduces a non-
standard measurement error problem called “division bias” by allowing measurement error
in hours to enter both the left hand and right hand side of the estimating equation (7). This
can drive estimates of the wage elasticity to negative values.19
18An alternative strategy is to assume workers can anticipate future wage growth based on their current wage
and thus use lagged wages or wage changes as instruments, as in Altonji (1986), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), and
Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), among others. However, in the presence of tied wage-hours oﬀers, changes in hours
worked caused by changes in preferences will impact the wage. This violates the orthogonality assumptions
of the life cycle labor supply model. Because lagged wages depend on lagged hours, lagged wages will only
be a valid instrument for the current wage if E[∆εitεit−k] = 0 for wages lagged k periods. It is possible to
show that a slightly modiﬁed version of the lagged wage instrument that adjusts lagged wages by θ log hit can
potentially eliminate this feedback eﬀect. Results are available upon request. But it appears to us that the
age proﬁle is clearly a cleaner instrument in a setting with tied wage-hours oﬀers.
19One potential solution we have tried is to instrument for the current wage change using twice lagged wages.
If measurement error is white noise, twice lagged wages (or wage changes) will be uncorrelated with the current
wage change. However, French (2004a) and Ziliak and Kneiser (1999) provide evidence that the measurement
error in earnings and hours is autocorrelated and thus cannot solve inconsistency problems associated with σ.
We have also tried using the reported wage of hourly workers. Its advantage is that it overcomes the division
bias problem since measurement error in the reported hourly wage is likely to be uncorrelated with both
13Second, eﬀective marginal rates are computed for each household using the NBER’s
Taxsim program. We augment these rates with payroll tax schedules obtained from the
Tax Policy Center at the Urban Institute. For the state and federal calculations, we assume
that all married households ﬁle jointly and use the standard deduction. We also assume that
income is provided solely through the head and spouse’s wages and salaries. The number of
dependents, including those who qualify for the age 65 exemption, are provided by the PSID
and accounted for in the computations.
Figure 1 displays marginal tax rates for individuals in our sample.20 Circles represent
single ﬁlers, squares represent heads of household, and triangles represent joint ﬁlers. There is
variation within income level due to cross-sectional diﬀerences in state tax law, variation over
time in federal and state tax law, diﬀerences in the number of dependents across households,
and ﬁling status across households. Nevertheless, the dominant source of variation in marginal
tax rates is from labor income. A simple regression of log(1 − τ 
it)o nl o gi n c o m eh a sa nR2
of 0.49. A third order income polynomial, as we use, yields an R2 of 0.52.
hours and earnings. However, there are two distinct disadvantages. First, only hourly employees are included,
which limits the sample size substantially and introduces potentially important nonrandomness to the sample.
Second, overtime pay and bonuses are excluded. The latter concern is critical since overtime and bonuses are
an important source of wage variation.
20To account for substantial changes in the tax code introduced by the 1986 law changes, we show the rates
separately pre- and post-reform. It is also important to note that there are few households facing negative
marginal tax rates because we include payroll taxes and limit the sample to those households headed by men
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Figure 1: Marginal Tax Rates
155R e s u l t s
Table 1 reports our estimates of the various labor supply elasticities. The ﬁrst two columns
report ﬁndings when the contemporaneous wage change is deﬁned as annual earnings divided
by annual hours and the parameter θ, the wage-hours tie, is set to 0 in column 1 and 0.4
in column 2. The 0.4 estimate is in the middle to upper end of the estimates in the tied
wage-hours oﬀer literature.21 It implies that cutting weekly work hours from 40 to 20 leads
to a 24 percent reduction in the oﬀered hourly wage. A θ = 0 assumes that the hourly wage
is not a function of hours worked. In both columns, the ﬁndings are based on speciﬁcations
that use a third order age polynomial as a means of exploiting the life cycle proﬁle of wages.
The top panel displays the F − statistic and R2 from the ﬁrst-stage regressions to show
the power of this instrument. The instruments seems to be strongly associated with contem-
poraneous wage changes, with the F − statistic exceeding standard thresholds.
The bottom panel reports the size of the four key labor supply parameters: σ∗
IV,σ ,and













. These elasticities are
described in equations (11) and (14).22
21See Aaronson and French (2004), Blank (1990), Ermisch and Wright (1993), and Rosen (1976). Biddle










is somewhat diﬃcult to interpret because the marginal tax rate is a function

























, or the percent increase in labor supply given a change in γ0 that is suﬃciently
large to increase log(1 − τ
 
it)b y1p e r c e n t .
16Dependent variable Hourly wage Hourly wage Annual earnings Annual earnings
θ = 0 0.4 0 0.4
First Stage Estimates, Dependent Variable is ∆logwit
F − statistic 5.4 5.4 18.6 18.6
R2 0.016 0.016 0.025 0.025
N 15,989 15,989 15,989 15,989
Second Stage Estimates, Dependent Variable is ∆loghit
σ∗
IV 0.62 0.62 0.81 0.81
(0.16) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06)
σ 0.64 0.64 1.13 1.13







0.64 0.86 1.13 2.06







0.57 0.69 0.92 1.31
(0.17) (0.26) (0.23) (0.47)
Life cycle instrument set is a third order age polynomial.
Other right hand side variables are year dummies, health status change, and education.
Table 1: Estimated Labor Supply Elasticities, PSID 1977-1989
1
7We that ﬁnd that σ∗
IV and σ are 0.62 (standard error of .16)23 and 0.64 (0.22).24 Note
that, as argued in appendix C, failure to account for progressive taxation does lead to a
downward biased estimate of σ (i.e. 0.64 versus 0.62). However, this eﬀect is small. Allowing
wage-hours ties (i.e., setting θ =0 .4) increases the hours response to a change in (1−τ 
it)b y
34 percent, to 0.86, relative to σ. That is, a 1 percent increase in (1−τ 
it) has an initial eﬀect
of increasing the after tax wage by 1 percent, which in turn increases hours by 0.64 percent.
However, the longer workweek further increases the hourly wage, due to the wage-hours tie.
This leads to a further increase in hours worked. Thus, the initial 1 percent increase in
(1 − τ 
it) increases hours by 0.86 percent.








, falls to 0.69, only 8 percent higher than σ and 11 percent
higher than σ∗
IV.25 This result arises from higher income leading to a higher marginal tax
rate, which dampens the labor supply response to the original tax change. As it turns out, in
this case, the eﬀect of progressivity oﬀsets much, but not all, of the tied wage-hours eﬀect.26
In the data section, we noted that division bias, in combination with small samples, leads
to estimates that are biased downward. To minimize this problem, we respecify the labor
supply function in terms of log earnings rather than log wages.27 It can be easily shown that
this modiﬁcation results in σ being biased to zero rather than -1 from measurement error.
However, Ghez and Becker (1975) point out that omitted variables potentially lead to an
23Standard errors are computed using the multivariate delta method and correct for arbitrary forms of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
24These estimates are at the high end of the literature for men, although consistent with the ﬁndings of Lee
(2001) who uses a similar sample and instrument set. Lee ﬁnds that using unbalanced data and a parsimonious
instrument set overcomes small sample bias, and thus leads to higher estimates of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution.
25The results are similar when we restrict our sample to those 12,533 workers with lagged earnings and hours,


















26When there is no wage-hours tie, ignoring progressivity leads to a 8 percent reduction (from 0.62 vs. 0.57)
in the labor supply response to a one percent change in marginal rates. This is in contrast to Mulligan (1999),
who ﬁnds that progressivity biases downward labor supply responses. Mulligan emphasizes the diﬀerence
between σ
∗







. Our results show that the latter eﬀect
is more important.




 (.)) + ∆logEit

− ˜ σ log β(1 + rt−1(1 − τA)) + ˜ σ







18upward bias using this speciﬁcation. Results are in columns 3 and 4 of table 1. Using the age
















to 1.30 when θ =0 .4.
We also estimated equation (7) on men in the outgoing rotation ﬁles of the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS). The key advantage of the CPS, particularly the outgoing rotation ﬁles,
is large samples. Using similar sample selection criterion as those in our PSID sample, almost
700,000 men between 1979 to 1999 can be used in the estimation. Although the questions
are more limited than the PSID, we can recreate the PSID speciﬁcation, less information on
health status. The drawback is that only two observations per person are available. Our
estimates, based on the age polynomial instruments, are smaller than the PSID. We get esti-
mates of σ∗
IV of just below 0.20, which is inelastic enough that the bias that arises from tied
wage-hours and progressive taxation is hard to detect.
6 Calibration
The estimation results suggest that progressive taxation oﬀsets much but not all of the
impact of wage-hours ties. We generalize this result in table 2 by describing calibrations of






, when plausible ranges of the underlying parameters, θ, σ∗
IV,
and γ1 are introduced. For θ, we allow the wage-hours relationship to vary from 0 to 0.60,
which seems to cover the range of estimates in the literature. Most studies measure σ∗
IV to
be between 0 and 0.5 for continuously employed men but are often greater than 1 for women
(e.g. Heckman and MaCurdy (1980)). Therefore, we allow this parameter to vary between 0
and 1.5 to account for the vast majority of estimates in the literature.
Finally, we allow γ1 to take on four values: 0, -0.10, -0.18, and -0.28. Zero represents
a proportional tax schedule. Larger negative values of γ1 characterize more progressive tax




1 − ˜ σ
. (18)
28This is based on a regression of the PSID respondents’ eﬀective marginal tax rate on log income. Adding
a more complicated log income polynomial has only a marginal impact on the progressivity parameters as well
as the general ﬁt of the regression.
19Panel A displays the proportional tax case. When σ∗
IV =0 .5a n dθ =0 .4, the bias
introduced by tied wage-hours oﬀers is 26 percent (0.63 versus 0.50). With σ∗
IV =1 , a
relevant case for women, the bias introduced by θ =0 .4 is 67 percent. However, inelastic
labor supply or a small wage-hours tie results in a smaller bias.
Panel B introduces progressive taxes but at a level almost half that of the U.S. The
oﬀsetting eﬀect of progressivity is readily apparent. Rather than a 26 percent bias when
σ∗
IV =0 .5a n dθ =0 .4, we see a 14 percent diﬀerence (0.57 versus 0.50). For σ∗
IV =1t h eb i a s
drops from 67 to 35 percent. With no tied wage-hours relationship, ignoring progressivity
l e a d st oa4t o9p e r c e n to v e r s t a t e m e n tσ∗
IV when it is between 0.5 to 1.0.
When progressivity is assumed to be at the average level in the U.S. during the 1977 to
1989 period (panel C), the bias introduced by θ =0 .4f a l l st o8t o1 7p e r c e n t ,f o rv a l u e so f
σ∗
IV between 0.5 and 1.0. This is consistent with the empirical exercise of the last section.
Finally, only when tax progressivity is almost 50 percent higher than what we have seen in
the U.S. (i.e. γ1 = −0.28) or when θ =0 .2, roughly half of what is found in Aaronson and
French (2004), does progressive taxation completely oﬀset the impact of hours-wage ties.
7 Conclusions
There are two important caveats to our analysis. First, we consider the decision of how
many hours to work (the “intensive margin”), not the decision of whether to work (the
“extensive margin”).29 Heckman (1993) contends that most of the variability in labor supply
is at the extensive margin. Furthermore, French (2004b) argues that a large ﬁxed cost of
work is necessary to reconcile a high labor supply elasticity at the extensive margin, but a
low labor supply elasticity at the intensive margin. It is not clear to what extent the results
in this paper extend to a model with a labor force participation decision when there are ﬁxed
costs of work.
The second concern is that we focus only on the substitution eﬀect associated with tax
wage changes. Understanding the substitution eﬀects is arguably suﬃcient for understanding
the labor supply response to short-term tax adjustments. However, to understand the im-
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portance of fundamental tax reform, it is necessary to recognize the wealth eﬀects associated
with tax changes.
Nevertheless, we believe that we have shown, both qualitatively and quantitatively, that
augmenting a standard intertemporal labor supply model to account for tied wage-hours oﬀers
and progressive taxation aﬀects estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and
the labor supply response to tax changes. Using common methods to estimate men’s labor
supply functions, we ﬁnd that the hours response to a change in marginal tax rates may be
biased by as much as 10 percent, relative to many of the estimates in the literature, when
not accounting for these features of the data. The bias could be up to 20 percent or so for
21populations with more elastic labor supply, such as women. Therefore, tax analysts inferring
the extent of behavioral responses to tax changes should consider the source of variation used
for identiﬁcation.
Appendix A: The speciﬁcation of tied wage-hours oﬀers
To formally capture the link between hours worked and the oﬀered wage, we ﬁrst note
that, in equilibrium, perfectly competitive ﬁrms cover their ﬁxed costs so that total output
equals the wage bill plus the ﬁxed cost of work:
pithit = withit + φ (19)
where φ is the ﬁxed cost per employee, pit is productivity of worker i at time t, hit is hours
worked, and wit is the oﬀered hourly wage. By rewriting equation (19) as




it is obvious that the oﬀered hourly wage is rising in hours worked. This relationship implies
that at points in the life cycle or tax cycle that hours worked are high, the oﬀered wage
should also be high.
Empirical research typically estimates a linearized version of the hours-wage relationship
as in equation (2) in the text. For example, Aaronson and French (2004) estimate θ =0 .4,
a result that appears to be well within the bounds found in the literature. The only papers
that we are aware of that test for the existence of a nonlinearity in lnhit are Moﬃtt (1984)
and Biddle and Zarkin (1989). While both papers ﬁnd that equation (2) is misspeciﬁed, we
have been unable to ﬁnd any evidence of nonlinearities in either the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) or Current Population Survey (CPS).30
Regardless, it is straightforward to compute the approximation bias assumed in equation
(2) at diﬀerent hours levels. The left panel in ﬁgure 2 plots the estimated relationship
between hours worked and the oﬀered hourly wage, using equation (2), and an estimate of
θ =0 .4 derived from Aaronson and French (2004). It also presents the structural relationship
30Furthermore, at least in the case of Biddle and Zarkin, even their smallest estimates of the elasticity of
wages with respect to hours worked appear implausibly large. As we show in section 6, their implied estimates
would suggest huge biases to the estimation of intertemporal labor supply elasticities, in cases where this
elasticity is suﬃciently large.
22between hours worked and the oﬀered hourly wage using equation (20), again ﬁtted to match
Aaronson and French’s estimate of θ. The right hand panel plots the elasticity of the wage
with respect to hours worked implied by equations (20) and (2).31 Between 1,700 hours and
2,500 hours, encompassing 68 percent of our sample, the implied elasticity from equation (20)
is 0.48 to 0.28, versus the constant elasticity implied by equation (2). Therefore, we conclude
the linearized relationship in equation (2) provides a good approximation to the structural
equation (20).
Moreover, the estimated value of θ seems to provide a plausible estimate of the ﬁxed cost
of work. We ﬁnd φ = $13,450 and pit = $23.30, implying that 28 percent of ﬁrm’s labor costs
13,450
13,450+17.26∗1,941 are ﬁxed. This accords reasonably well with the studies on recruitment and
training costs cited in Malcomson (1999).
Figure 2: Offered Hourly Wage as a Function of Hours
31We use our estimate of θ =0 .4, and pick αit to match the average work year length (1,941 hours) and
wage ($17.26, in 1996 dollars) from the sample of older PSID (age 50 to 70) males for equation (2). We pick
pit and φ to match the average wage and an elasticity of 0.4 at 1,941 hours of work for our ﬁtted equation
(20).
23Appendix B: Controlling for changes in the marginal utility of wealth
This appendix describes our approach for dealing with changes in the marginal utility
of wealth in order to derive equation (7) from the ﬁrst diﬀerenced labor supply function
illustrated in equation (6). The discussion follows MaCurdy (1985), in which the marginal
utility of wealth and, in approximation, the log of the marginal utility of wealth are shown
to follow a random walk with drift. This result falls out of the Euler equation of the model
described in section 2.1. In particular, the Euler equation indicates that individuals equate
expected marginal utility across time according to:
λit−1 = β(1 + rt−1(1 − τA))Et−1λit (21)
where rational expectations32 implies that innovations to the marginal utility of wealth, de-
noted  it, should be uncorrelated with lagged values of the marginal utility of wealth:
λit = Et−1λit +  it (22)
Equations (21) and (22) can be rewritten as









Taking logarithms of both sides of (23) and approximating log(1 +
β(1+rt−1(1−τA)) it
λit−1 ) yields
logλit − logλit−1 +l o gβ(1 + rt−1(1 − τA)) = log

1+




β(1 + rt−1(1 − τA)) it
λit−1
(24)
We assume that the approximation in (24) holds with equality, a valid assumption as
innovations in the marginal utility of wealth become arbitrarily small.
32If workers have rational expectations then at time t they know their state variables αit,θ,r t,ε it,τ it the
Markov process that determines the evolution of the state variables, and optimize accordingly.
24Combining (24) and (6) results in
∆loghit = σ

∆log(1− τ (.)) + ∆logwit

− σ logβ(1 + rt−1(1 − τA)) + σ




Because the innovation to the marginal utility of wealth is potentially correlated with wage
changes if the wage change is unanticipated, the wage must be instrumented. See section 3
for a discussion on instrument selection.
Appendix C: Bias from failure to control for tied wage-hours oﬀers and
progressive taxation when estimating the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution
In this appendix we consider the likely biases caused by failure to control for tied wage-
hours oﬀers and progressive taxation when estimating the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution parameter σ. We show that disregarding progressive taxation leads to a downward
biased estimate of σ, as the econometrician overstates the amount of post-tax wage variability
that the individual faces. The intuition for this result is straightforward. An anticipated 1
percent change in the post-tax wage causes a σ percent change in hours worked. However, a
1 percent change in the pre-tax wage will lead to less than a 1 percent change in the post-tax
wage and thus less than a σ percent change in hours worked.
We also show that overlooking tied wage-hours oﬀers potentially leads to inconsistent
estimates of σ. The fundamental problem that the econometrician must face when estimating
the labor supply response to a wage change is the simultaneous equations bias. Because
hours and wages are jointly determined, the econometrician must be careful that that he is
estimating a labor supply function (where hours are a function of the wage) rather than a
labor demand function (where wages are a function of hours worked). Failure to properly
control for the simultaneous equations bias likely leads to an upward bias in σ, as we show
below.
Therefore, just as the eﬀects of tied wage-hours oﬀers and progressive taxation tend to
oﬀset when predicting the labor supply response to a tax change for a given σ, the eﬀects of
tied wage-hours oﬀers and progressive taxation tend to oﬀset when computing the bias in the
estimated value of σ.
25In order to simplify the analysis, consider the case where log(1−τ 
it()) is linear in the log
of labor income, and that the marginal tax rate is unaﬀected by spousal income:
log(1 − τ (withit + yit)) = γ0 + γ1

log(wit)+l o g ( hit)

. (26)
Further, ignore the importance of variable interest rates and observable preference shifters.33
Therefore, equation (7) can be rewritten as:
∆loghit = σ

∆log(1− τ (.)) + ∆logwit

+∆ uit (27)
where ∆uit = σ
β(1+rt−1(1−τA)) it
λit−1 +∆ εit. Combining equations (??), (26), and (7) yields the











(1 − σγ1)∆αit + θ∆uit

+∆ uit
1 − σ(γ1(1 + θ)+θ)
. (29)






where σ∗ is the wage coeﬃcient on the misspeciﬁed model.
Next, we show derivations of the estimated coeﬃcient σ∗,σ∗
IV using our instrumental
variables procedure. Consider the case where Cov(∆uit,Z it) = 0 (i.e. the instrument is
uncorrelated with preferences and the marginal utility of wealth)and and Cov(logwit,Z it)=
σ2
Z  = 0 (i.e., it is correlated with the productivity parameter ∆αit). For example, arguably,
the life-cycle wage proﬁle of men measures changes in life cycle productivity but not changes
33In other words, consider a model where both the log post-tax wage and post-tax hours worked are the
residuals from regressions of the log post tax wage and log hours worked on year dummies and observable
preference shifters. Using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993), it is straight-
forward to show that using this approach will still yield a consistent estimate of σ.
26in life cycle preferences. In this case, we can consider the correlation caused by Zit.34 then
σ∗
IV =









IV is the probability limit of the estimate. Recall that γ1 < 0, so the estimated labor
supply elasticity is biased downwards. However, if γ1 =0 , then σ∗
IV = σ. Therefore, many
common instrumental variables strategies overcome problems generated by tied wage-hours
oﬀers. However, these strategies will not overcome the model misspeciﬁcation problem of
using the pre-tax wage rather than the post-tax wage.








. Combining equations (14) and (31), and assuming















Lastly, we note that instrumental variables estimation of equation (27) does yield consis-
tent estimates of σ. Using equations (26), (27), (28) and (29), the estimate of σ using E(∆αit)
as the instrument for

∆log(1− τ (.)) + ∆logwit







Z = σ. (33)
By the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem, by using dummy variables for the interest rate, the
procedure will provide consistent estimates of σ in equation (7) also.
34More precisely, we can think of an individual’s age-speciﬁc productivity as being the sum of two orthogonal
components, or αit = αt + ψit where αt is the age-speciﬁc component of wages and ψit is the idiosyncratic
component of wages, and E[αtψit]=0 . In this case using αt as the instrument (which is another way of saying
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